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Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm:
a pragmatist turn?
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ABSTRACT
This article examines the rise of resilience discourses in EU foreign
policy. The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) refers to
building state and societal resilience in its neighbourhood as one
of the key strategic priorities of the EU. This article argues that the
discourse of resilience that permeates the EUGS chimes well with
a pragmatist turn in social sciences and global governance. The
EUGS introduces resilience-building alongside an emphasis on
flexibility, tailor-made approaches and the need for local
ownership, capacity-building and comprehensiveness. More
importantly, the new EUGS proposes “principled pragmatism” as a
new operating principle in its foreign policy. While this might
suggest a more pragmatic EU foreign policy, a closer examination
of the EUGS discourse reveals significant tensions between a
pragmatic and a principled foreign policy, which undermine the
added value of resilience-building as a new foreign policy paradigm.
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The concept of resilience has gradually colonised the foreign policy discourse and
practice of most Western states and international organisations as evidenced by the US
National Security Strategy (White House 2015) and UN reports on climate change,
disaster-preparedness and development policy (UN 2012, 2013), to mention but a few.
More recently, the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) refers to building state and
societal resilience in its neighbourhood as one of the key strategic priorities of the EU. It
would be just easy to dismiss resilience as mere rhetoric or another “buzzword” in the
EU’s jargon to join the likes of “effective multilateralism” and the “comprehensive
approach”. But as with these other concepts, their reiteration in EU circles might have
the effect of mobilising action in particular directions, not least shaping the EU’s inter-
national identity. Since this discourse has particular political effects, it is important to
scrutinise what the addition of this new policy priority might entail for the EU’s foreign
policy. In other words, what does the EU mean by resilience-building? And what are the
implications of the rise of resilience in the EU’s foreign policy discourse?
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Drawing on the resilience literature, this article argues that the discourse of resilience
that permeates the EUGS chimes well with a pragmatist turn in social sciences and
global governance which focuses on the practical consequences of actions and local prac-
tices. In this vein, the EUGS introduces resilience-building alongside an emphasis on flexi-
bility, tailor-made approaches and the need for local ownership, capacity-building and
comprehensiveness. More importantly, the new EUGS proposes “principled pragmatism”
as a new operating principle in its foreign policy. This pragmatist turn could serve as a
new catalyst for EU foreign policy and provide an opportunity to move beyond the
“liberal peace” towards a more bottom-up approach to building peace. However, by pro-
posing principled pragmatism in the form of resilience-building as a new foreign policy
paradigm, the EU has tried to square the circle, raising in turn more theoretical and prac-
tical problems than it solves. Theoretically, principled pragmatism implies that the EU
should act in accordance with universal values (liberal ones in this case), but then
follow a pragmatic approach which denies the moral imperatives of those universal cat-
egories. The EU needs to be either pragmatic or principled; it cannot have it both ways.
In practical terms, while claiming that it will continue to promote democracy and
human rights, it is argued that the EU should do so on a case-by-case basis. This is
bound to generate more criticisms of self-interest, selectivity and double standards and
accentuate the weaknesses and limitations of the EU as an international actor, eroding
its identity as a normative power. In sum, the EU has adopted the new concept of resili-
ence and a more pragmatic attitude in the EUGS, but it remains tied to the old liberal
scripts, failing to resolve existing tensions in its foreign policy.
The article proceeds as follows. It firstly situates the resilience discourse within existing
and previous developments in EU foreign policy. Drawing on the resilience literature, the
article then explains what the implications of the emergence of this discourse are for
global governance and how this has been theorised in international relations. This contri-
bution argues that resilience can be located within a pragmatic turn in social sciences,
which has moved from the search for objective and universal laws to examining the prac-
tical consequences of acts. Secondly, this pragmatist turn also fits with a renewed focus on
local practices andmicro-processes. The third part of the article examines whether the resi-
lience discourse contained in the EUGS can be understood as a pragmatic turn in EU
foreign policy and what the implications and challenges of this might be for the EU’s
role and identity as an international actor.
The rise of resilience in EU foreign policy
On 28 June 2016, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice
President of the European Commission (HR/VP), Federica Mogherini, officially presented
the “EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy” (hereafter EUGS) to the European
Council. While the attention of the Heads of State and Government was absorbed by the
outcome of the British referendum and many suggested that the presentation of the EUGS
should be postponed or even ditched altogether, the HR/VP’s view was that it was pre-
cisely at this moment in time that a Global Strategy for the Union was needed (see also
Tocci 2016).
There is no need to rehearse here the whole process of how the EUGS came to light (see
for instance, Missiroli 2015), suffice to mention that the preparatory work for the EUGS was
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launched after the European Council Conclusions in December 2013 in the form of a stra-
tegic assessment presented to the Council in June 2015 (EEAS 2015). On the basis of this
assessment, the Council tasked the HR/VP with the drafting of the document. This final
process included wide consultations with EU member states, EU institutions, third-
country representatives, civil society, experts and academics. While the content of the
EUGS owes a lot to Nathalie Tocci, Special Adviser to EU HRVP Federica Mogherini, and
the European External Action Service (EEAS) Strategic Planning Division, the extensive
process of discussion described earlier suggests that the EUGS represents a degree of con-
sensus within EU foreign policy circles. Because of this, it is even more remarkable that the
term resilience has such an important place in this strategy. Resilience, defined in the EUGS
as “the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from
internal and external crises” (EUGS 2016, p. 23), is mentioned no less than 41 times in
the 60-page document. More specifically, building “state and societal resilience to our
East and South” is identified as one of the five key priorities for the EU’s external action
(alongside building the Union’s own security; pursuing an integrated approach to conflicts
and crises; supporting cooperative regional orders and a commitment to a reformed multi-
lateral, rules-based system of global governance). Moreover, references to resilience and to
resilient societies, states and democracies span beyond this specific section to other parts
of the document to include the resilience of critical infrastructure, networks and services
and the resilience of the EU’s democracies.
This is certainly not the first time resilience has beenmentioned in an EUdocument. Resi-
lience was first embraced by the development community in Brussels, following similar
trends in the UN system, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) (2008) and other EUmember states (see, for instance, Cabinet Office 2011). In devel-
opment, humanitarian and disaster and risk reduction management policies, resilience is
defined as “the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region
to withstand, cope, adapt, and quickly recover from stresses and shocks such as violence,
conflict, drought and other natural disasters without compromising long-term develop-
ment” (European Commission 2016, p. 1). This understanding of resilience was endorsed
by the Council in its Council Conclusions on an EU Approach to Resilience (Council of the
EU 2013), followed up by the Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries for
2013–2020 (European Commission 2013). These documents have further recognised the
need to prioritise a number of elements in the EU’s policy cycle: risk assessment, risk
reduction, prevention, mitigation and preparedness, and swift response to and recovery
from crises. The EU Resilience Compendium (European Commission 2014) illustrates with
concrete examples how the resilience approach is being translated into reality. The most
notable examples of EU resilience initiatives include AGIR (The Global Alliance for Resilience
Initiative) in the Sahel and SHARE (Supporting the Horn of Africa’s Resilience).
From development and humanitarian policies, resilience has slowly but surely made its
way to the foreign and security policy arena. The vagueness and malleability of the term
mean that it has been embraced by a wide range of actors and in a multitude of contexts
(Wagner and Anholt 2016). In the area of foreign policy, resilience has thus been preferred
over more “tainted” and politically riskier concepts such as democratisation. The revised
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) strategy adopted at the end of 2015 is one of
the first documents to introduce resilience-building as a foreign policy goal. According
to the document, “[t]he measures set out in this Joint Communication seek to offer
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ways to strengthen the resilience of the EU’s partners in the face of external pressures and
their ability to make their own sovereign choices” (European Commission and HR/VP
2015b, p. 4). However, it also adds that “the new ENP will take stabilisation as its main pol-
itical priority” (Commission and HR/VP 2015b, p. 2). While this is slightly different from the
way the EUGS understands resilience (as “the ability to reform”), both of them seem to rely
on resilience to operate a move towards a more pragmatic foreign policy. If this is the case,
what would this move entail? Before examining in more detail the EUGS, it is worth having
a look first at the wider literature on resilience for some clues.
Resilience, governance and pragmatism
While the concept of resilience was once the preserve of systems ecology and biology, it
has now entered the social sciences vocabulary. From its original meaning “to jump back”
(in Latin, resilio), the meaning of resilience has metamorphosed between and within dis-
ciplines so that we can argue that there is no agreement on what resilience actually means
(Brasset et al. 2013). First uses of the concept of resilience in systems ecology tended to
emphasise the ability of systems to return to an equilibrium ex ante (this is also in line
with understandings of resilience in engineering). By contrast, in his study of large ecologi-
cal systems, Holling refers to resilience as “a measure of the ability of these systems to
absorb changes of state variables, driving variables and parameters, and still persist”
(Holling 1973, p. 17), which suggests a much more dynamic understanding of resilience.
From ecology, the notion of resilience then travelled to psychology (Seligman 2011), pol-
itical economy (Cooper and Walker 2011) disaster and crisis response (Boin et al. 2010),
development and humanitarian aid (Duffield 2012) and peace-building (Chandler 2012,
2013). Brasset et al. (2013, p. 222) argue that “like it or not, resilience is fast becoming
the organising principle in contemporary political life”.
In politics and international relations, resilience has increasingly been conceived as a
new form of governance, in particular, as an “anticipatory form of governance” (Cooper
and Walker 2011) and governance “from a distance” (Joseph 2014). As such, resilience
represents a shift from a logic focused on known threats and prevention (predominant
during the Cold and post-Cold War period) to a new governmental logic (or rationality),
which emphasises complexity and uncertainty and thus the impossibility of predicting
threats. As a consequence, resilience requires us to be prepared for unknown risks; adap-
tation, learning by doing and flexibility as a way to respond to shocks, to embrace change
and to live with rather than completely eliminate uncertainty (Duffield 2012, Reid 2012,
Evans and Reid 2014).
When applied to societies and organisations, resilience acknowledges uncertainty
and complexity as a contemporary condition, but emphasises internal capacities and
capabilities as the way to deal with these problems, rather than external intervention.
Understood in this way, resilience can be defined as “the internal capacity of societies
to cope with crises, with the emphasis on the development of self-organisation and
internal capacities and capabilities rather than the external provision of aid, resources
or policy solutions” (Chandler 2015b, p. 13). Thus, the new resilience paradigm
imposes a degree of restraint on Western international actors by acknowledging that
external imposition through coercion and/or conditionality as a way to spread universal
(liberal) recipes cannot solve complex emergent problems. Instead adaptive and novel
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solutions are required, as well as a much more pragmatic approach to international
intervention.
The emergence of resilience can thus be located in a context where pragmatism has
been on the rise, both in practice and in theory. In policy practice, the setbacks that
Western powers have suffered since the early 2000s have led to a resurgence of pragmatic
policy-making (Goetschel 2011). As put by Joseph, resilience “turns from the grand pro-
jects of social engineering and universal rights to take a much more pragmatist view of
social life” (Joseph 2016, p. 379). For instance, President Barack Obama has been labelled
a “pragmatist” several times. But even a constructivist scholar such as John Ruggie, who
has served as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and
Human Rights since 2015, has called for “a new pragmatic approach” to promoting
human rights principles to ensure business support for human rights globally (Snyder
and Vinjamuri 2012, p. 435). For their part, Haldrup and Rosén have noted how United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initiatives have moved from a focus on large-
scale institution-building to a more pragmatic approach, “making whatever structures
do exist resilient through propping up the individual capacities of the people running
them”, that is, working with what is already there through a “coaching and mentoring
approach” (Haldrup and Rosén 2013, p. 140). This has been accompanied by a change
in vocabulary from capacity-building to “capacity development”. Resilience can thus be
linked with this move towards more pragmatic policy-making, but it can also be located
within a pragmatic turn in the social sciences. The latter entails two developments: (1) a
rediscovery of pragmatist philosophy, with its rejection of objective and universal laws,
and its emphasis on the practical consequences of acts; and (2) a renewed focus on
local practices and micro-processes heralded by pragmatic sociology.
Firstly, contemporary resilience thinking can be linked to some of the ideas of early
twentieth-century philosophical pragmatism. Pragmatist philosophers like William James
or John Dewey shared a concern with epistemological uncertainty and complexity,
which challenged Cartesian notions of objective truth, and argued that in order to ascer-
tain truth, we should turn to “practical consequences”. Pragmatist fallibilism also means all
theories and beliefs should be treated as working hypotheses which may need to be
revised in light of future experience. From this perspective, the aim is not to arrive at absol-
ute certainty so that we can reach the truth, but to be sure that we have the correct
method of enquiry so that we can identify errors. Enquiry is also seen as a community
activity or as shared enquiry. More recently, a number of thinkers, such as Richard
Rorty, Hilary Putnam or Robert Brandom, among others, have also identified themselves
with pragmatism or developed some of the ideas of the pragmatist tradition (see for
instance, Rorty 1982, Putnam 1994, Brandom 2011). Drawing on philosophical pragma-
tism, Schmidt (2015, p. 416) argues that resilience “points us to a more appropriate, realis-
tic and much more promising source of empowerment: we need to shift our focus from
causal forces to consequences”. In line with pragmatist theory, she argues that
human agency in resilience discourses is no longer primarily thought of in terms of seeking to
shape the external environment through conscious, autonomous and goal-oriented decision-
making. Instead, agency resurfaces in terms of making (constant) change on inner life through
learning from exposure to the contingencies of ontological complexity. (Schmidt 2015, p. 404)
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This understanding of resilience directs attention not only to the limitations, but also to
the opportunities and new possibilities for transformation that present to agency in
conditions of uncertainty and complexity. In particular, resilience puts an emphasis on
learning and robustness as central processes. This is in line with Deweyan understandings
of governance, which see governance as “a continuous process of self-transformation
through experiencing and learning from life” (Schmidt 2015, p. 416). Moreover, learning
seems particularly relevant in times of crisis: rather than being seen as fatalistic, crises
can lead to innovation through learning and, as a consequence, resilience can help
unblock deadlocks and help us reach our full potential (Schmidt 2015, p. 408). For its
part, robustness refers to reiterative cycles of experiencing, experimenting and learning,
in a world in which new information is constantly produced, but does not lead to
greater knowledge (Hallegatte et al. cited in Schmidt 2015, p. 418). An EU foreign policy
inspired by pragmatism should thus be open to learning from the consequences of every-
day acts, embracing complexity and uncertainty as an opportunity rather than as a threat.
Secondly, resilience discourses can also be located within current discussions about the
importance of the “everyday” in politics and international relations, which have been
informed to a large degree by French pragmatic sociology. As put by Joseph (2016,
p. 379): “[t]he paradox of contemporary understandings of the world is that the more
uncertain we are of the bigger (global) picture, the more we must rely on the small
detail of the little picture”. Since we cannot grasp complexity at the macro-level, we
should turn our attention to the micro-level in order to better adapt to changes. According
to Chandler (2015a), resilience approaches inspired by pragmatic sociologists like Michel
de Certeau, Luc Boltanski and Bruno Latour can help by bringing to light the transforma-
tive power of local practices and understandings, trying to understand “actors en situ-
ation”. Pragmatic sociology focuses on how everyday practices work in a particular
context. As Chandler (2015a, p. 29) argues, this approach “starts neither from universalist
nor cultural relativist assumptions with regard to formal institutional frameworks but with
the effects of their application in particular circumstances”. Seen from this perspective,
external intervention should only facilitate these practices “from below”, rather than
seeking to impose a universal blueprint as was the case with the liberal peace approach.
What this means for EU foreign policy is that resilience provides an opportunity to move
beyond the liberal peace to a more bottom-up approach to building peace.
While this pragmatist turn in policy practice and theory should be welcome, there are
still some problems with the way resilience operates from a pragmatist perspective. For
instance, while resilience highlights local agency and the need for responsibilisation,
there is also a tendency to depoliticise issues and, with this, the risk of acting as
“empire in denial” (Chandler 2006). Thus, Joseph (2016, p. 370) describes resilience as “a
new governance through denial that further shifts responsibility onto the governed”.
According to Brassett et al. (2013, p. 221), “resilience seems to carry a productive ambiguity
that both resists exact definition and allows for a spectrum of interactions and engage-
ments between policy and the everyday which are as (seemingly) effective as they are
(apparently) apolitical”. While this ambiguity explains its success in EU policy circles
(Wagner and Anholt 2016), the depoliticisation of resilience could obscure issues of
accountability and power relations (Chandler 2015a).
The question of power needs to be central in any examination of resilience. For
instance, Duffield (2012), Chandler (2013) and others have argued that Western powers
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and international organisations build the resilience of the underdeveloped as a way to
increase the security of the developed world. It can also be seen as part of a neo-liberal
agenda of rolling back the state (by increasing self-sufficiency) and removing barriers to
free markets. Resilience then allows the West to maintain a policy of intervention, but
this time avoiding charges of neo-colonialism by shifting responsibility to the governance
targets, giving them “responsibility without power” (Joseph 2013). In this light, resilience
could be seen as a continuation of neo-liberal forms of government. With its emphasis on
adaptation, partnership, self-reliance and the responsibilisation of individuals (as opposed
to the state), resilience reinforces neo-liberal economics. In fact, it is this fit with neo-liberal
forms of power that explains the spread of resilience. As explained by Walker and Cooper
(2011, p. 153),
across disciplines and policy arenas loosely concerned with the logistics of crisis management
[…] the success of this ecological concept in colonizing multiple arenas of governance is due
to its intuitive ideological fit with a neoliberal philosophy of complex adaptive systems.
From this perspective, resilience is “a form of neoliberal governmentality producing
neoliberal subjects” (Joseph 2016, p. 371). The following section examines whether the
introduction of resilience in the EUGS operates a move towards a more pragmatic
foreign policy and/or whether this can be seen as a continuation of a neo-liberal form
of governance.
Resilience and the pragmatic turn in the EUGS
Given the discussion above, does the inclusion of resilience in the EUGS denote a prag-
matic turn in European foreign policy? If so, what are the implications of this turn?
Looking at the operation of resilience in the EUGS, it would seem that the starting
premise is crisis, complexity and a sense of uncertainty, so this chimes well with global dis-
courses of resilience. The optimism contained in the opening statement of the European
Security Strategy adopted in 2003 – “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure
nor so free” (European Council 2003, p. 1) – could not be in more contrast to that of
the new EU Global Strategy. The new security strategy states: “We live in times of existential
crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European
project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being
questioned” (EUGS 2016, p. 7). The EEAS strategic assessment of 2015 speaks of a “more
connected, contested and complex world” (EEAS 2015). The EU’s approach on resilience
clearly connects increasing complexity with the rise of resilience:
Today’s world is characterised by increasingly complex challenges and trends: climate change,
protracted displacement, pandemics, extremism, population movements and growth. Such
challenges test the resilience of communities and national institutions and stretch the
ability of regional and international organisations to support them. (Council of the EU 2013,
p. 1)
According to Joseph, the failure to deal with complexity and uncertainty, as well as the
record of previous failures, is what has led to the rise of resilience, which is why he
labels resilience as “governance through failure” (Joseph 2016). Indeed, despite the insti-
tutional reforms brought forward by the Lisbon Treaty (2009), which included the estab-
lishment of the post of EU HR (Mogherini’s role) and the EEAS, there seems to be
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agreement among observers and policy-makers that the Union faces increasing political,
economic and existential challenges. Among them, the EU faces an internal crisis, which is
testing the European project, a crisis which stems from the Eurozone economic crisis and
the rise of populism and Euroscepticism, now worsened by the crisis resulting from the
vote of the UK to leave the EU. External crises include a deteriorating geopolitical environ-
ment in the Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods, the rise of Islamic terrorism and the
threat represented by ISIS, hybrid threats and the refugee crisis. To this, one can add a
broader crisis affecting the international liberal order, which has questioned the “liberal
peace” and Western interventionism (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, Mazarr 2014), and
in so doing the EU’s own global liberal project.
In this context of increasing complexity and uncertainty, the Union requires a new,
more pragmatic approach, and this is where resilience comes in. The resilience paradigm
draws on existing EU discourses and practices such as the comprehensive approach or
effective multilateralism and brings them together under a unifying logic. This approach
has at its core pragmatism and flexibility and requires several elements to make it work:
local ownership, capacity-building, partnerships, responsibility and a joint (comprehen-
sive) approach. Let us examine each of these elements in turn.
Firstly, resilience necessitates local ownership. In the area of development and peace-
building, it has been argued that the rise of resilience constitutes a way to adapt to the
failure of previous international interventions in the 1990s and the 2000s (Chandler
2015b, Joseph 2016). Given the failure of these universalist and externally imposed top-
down strategies (Prichard 2013), resilience operates a shift from the international to
local (and national) governments, communities and individuals who are the ones that
have to learn how to cope with complex risks. In this vein, the EUGS refers to both
state and society resilience: “resilience is a broader concept, encompassing all individuals
and the whole of society” (EUGS 2016, p. 24). The idea of “local ownership” is certainly
nothing new and has become another trope in the discourse of international policy-
makers, but it acquires a new meaning under the resilience paradigm as it is not only a
moral imperative, but also a pragmatic one. Resilience-building should ensure increased
legitimacy and effectiveness of EU external action as it involves those targeted by EU
foreign policy (see Wagner and Anholt 2016, p. 4).
This understanding of resilience shares a commitment to promote a “bottom up
approach” – or at least to “blend top-down and bottom-up efforts” (EUGS 2016, p. 31) –
to foster local agency. As put by the EUGS, “[p]ositive change can only be home-grown,
and may take years to materialise” (EUGS 2016, p. 27). Thus, local ownership also requires
a long-term commitment on the part of the EU. The EUGS expresses a commitment to
work with a variety of local actors: national governments, municipalities and civil
society. However, despite the emphasis on local ownership, the target of intervention,
the entry point, continues to be the state. As stated in the EU’s Approach to Resilience,
it is “primarily the national government’s responsibility to build resilience and to define
political, economic, environmental and social priorities accordingly” (Council of the EU
2013, p. 2). This is also evident in other EU documents such as the new Security Sector
Reform strategy, which prefers the term “national ownership” rather than local ownership
(European Commission and HR/VP 2016). However, the EUGS argues that state and
societal resilience are linked insofar that “[s]tates are resilient when societies feel they
are becoming better off and have hope in the future” (EUGS 2016, p. 26).
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Because of its focus on the local and everyday practices, resilience seeks to move
beyond previous institution-building programmes that sought holistic and externally
driven changes to building the capacity of local actors from the bottom-up. According
to Chandler (2013), resilience represents a turn in state-building discourses and practices
from the liberal peace’s emphasis on top-down institution-building to a bottom-up
approach of building the resilience of individuals, communities and societies. Haldrup
and Rosén (2013) argue that while institution-building has not been completely aban-
doned, the emphasis is now on capacity-building and/or capacity development. According
to the EU’s approach to resilience, “[t]o reduce humanitarian needs we must put people
first, and allow them, especially children, to fulfil their full potential” (Council of the EU
2013, p. 1). Through the lenses of resilience, interventions now should be focused at
the level of an actor’s capacities rather than on the external or international environment.
In the words of the EUGS:
We will work through development, diplomacy, and CSDP, ensuring that our security sector
reform efforts enable and enhance our partners’ capacities to deliver security within the
rule of law. We will cooperate with other international players, coordinating our work on
capacity-building with the UN and NATO in particular. (EUGS 2016, p. 26)
The EU’s role is to help states and societies build their resilience through knowledge trans-
fers (training, monitoring, mentoring and advising) and ﬁnancial transfers.1 Thus, the role
of the EU appears now as one of a facilitator, a mentor and a partner moving away from
discourses of “external intervention”.
The emphasis on capacity-building programmes also suggests that resilience requires
strong networks and partnerships at all levels. Partnership remains a key concept in the
EU’s foreign policy (see previously references to effective multilateralism in the European
Security Strategy). These partnerships will be established with states, regional and inter-
national organisations. Some of these partnerships will still be strategic partnerships
(with core partners, like-minded countries and regional groupings), but the Strategy
seeks to “think creatively about deepening tailor-made partnerships further” (EUGS 2016,
p. 25). The concept of partnership also extends to civil society and the private sector, as
they are thought to be “key players in a networked world” (EUGS 2016, p. 8). While refer-
ences to partnerships and multilateralism are nothing new at the EU level, the approach
now is a more pragmatic one: practice should be the guiding principle when determining
who is a strategic partner in what area. According to Grevi (2016, p. 9), “the strategy calls for
a pragmatic and flexible posture […] The issues at stake should determine the adequate
format to deliver solutions”. Grevi goes on to argue that this approach seems closer to
the “more instrumental, result-oriented attitude” of the USA (Grevi 2016, p. 9).
The concept of responsibility also places an important role here. The EU will assume its
responsibilities, but “cannot deliver alone” and hence other partners will also need to share
this responsibility. This is also in line with resilience’s emphasis on the responsibilisation of
local governments and communities as discussed above. Having said that, the EUGS does
contain a healthy dose of implicit self-criticism, referring to the need for the EU to live up to
its values and it claims that the EU should be guided by “a strong sense of responsibility”
(EUGS 2016, p. 17). There are many references to the need for consistency and responsi-
bility whether it is about ensuring the resilience of EU democracies, fighting terrorism or
transforming the global order. Responsibility is also seen as a sine qua non of credibility
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and hence of preserving the EU’s influence and power around the world, from the enlar-
gement process to advancing a rules-based global order. This responsibilisation, however,
also seeks to ensure that the EU remains a committed foreign policy actor in the world in
dealing with conflicts and crises. While it is acknowledged that “[t]here is no magic wand
to solve crises” and that “there are no neat recipes to impose solutions elsewhere” (EUGS
2016, p. 17), the solution it is argued is “responsible engagement” rather than passivity. It is
also about pragmatic engagement, favouring decisive responses in the Eastern and
Southern neighbourhoods, but “targeted engagement” elsewhere, deciding on a case-
by-case basis (EUGS 2016, pp. 18, 28). The content of the EU’s foreign policy will also
vary depending on the geographical area: while in the enlargement countries democrati-
sation will be pursued in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria, the further the EU
goes, the least this will be a concern. In the ENP, the aim is to foster “closer relations”,
but the issue of democracy promotion is not mentioned; free markets, however, are a
key objective there. In the surrounding areas, again democracy promotion is not men-
tioned, but the promotion and protection of human rights are and free markets are.
Resilience also requires comprehensiveness and a joint approach. Drawing on the Joint
Communication on the Comprehensive Approach (European Commission and HR/VP
2013), the EUGS refers to the need for joint action. A complex and interconnected
global world means that events in one part of the world will have an effect in other
parts of the world. Rather than seeking to isolate causes, resilience emphasises the
need for a comprehensive approach as a way to deal with complex problems. Effective
action necessitates coordination between different international and local actors at differ-
ent levels and between different policies, including a better linkage between internal and
external security policies and between EU and Member States policies. This also requires
joint assessments and shared strategies for the implementation of these policies (Council
of the EU 2013, p. 3, European Commission 2016, p. 2). In other words, “complexity requires
abandoning the ‘silo mentality’” (Pawlak 2015, p. 1).
Last but not least, resilience requires more flexibility. This constitutes a particular
challenge for the EU, given the division of competences between different actors and
instruments across the EU’s external action. However, the new focus on resilience could
facilitate a rethink of how to use existing instruments in a more flexible and practical
way to build resilience and the capacities of partners. A case in point is the new initiative
on Capacity-Building for Security and Development (CBSD) (European Commission and
HR/VP 2015a), which makes use of development funding to finance foreign policy initiat-
ives. The EU’s approach on resilience also argues that “different contexts require a differ-
entiated and targeted approach” (Council of the EU 2013, p. 2). Pragmatism also means
that there are “different paths to resilience”, rather than one single model (EUGS 2016,
p. 9). Practice and realities on the ground should be the organising principle, not insti-
tutional competencies and/or institutional turf wars. Tailor-made, realistic, pragmatic,
locally owned approaches need to be designed and implemented in order to be able to
deal with an uncertain environment. As put by Grevi (2016, p. 7),
Flexibility is the common denominator of a double balancing act that runs through the entire
strategy. For one, at the political level, the effort to reconcile unity of purpose with the diver-
sity of national outlooks and experiences. For another, at the operational level, the drive to
shape comprehensive, joined-up approaches while defining in a timely way targeted, tailor-
made policy packages to respond to needs.
10 A. E. JUNCOS
In sum, by bringing together all these different dimensions, resilience facilitates the emer-
genceof amore pragmatic EU foreignpolicy. The introduction of the idea of principledprag-
matism would arguably seem to support this conclusion. A closer look, however, reveals
some tensions between this pragmatist turn and the liberal model embedded in the EUGS.
Resilience meets “principled pragmatism”
The EUGS introduces the new notion of “principled pragmatism”, alongside an emphasis
on resilience-building. According to the EUGS:
We will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the
current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world. Prin-
cipled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead. (EUGS 2016, p. 8)
At ﬁrst sight, this seems consistent with the pragmatist turn that has been described
above. For one, resilience-building appears to be a self-interested strategy: “It is in the
interests of our citizens. Fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests. By
contrast, resilience […] beneﬁts us and countries in our surrounding regions, sowing
the seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant societies” (EUGS 2016, p. 23).2 Hence, the
EU will be working with both those countries that want closer ties with the EU and
those that have no wish to do so, including authoritarian states (EUGS 2016, p. 25). The
two key deciding factors when it comes to launching resilience-building programmes
would then be “acute fragility” and those countries where the EU “can make a meaningful
difference” (EUGS 2016, p. 25). Geopolitics will also play a role in determining where the EU
should be more active, with the EU focusing on the neighbourhood (broadly understood),
and only engaging elsewhere on a case-by-case basis (see above).
A more pragmatic approach will be thus based on a “realistic assessment” of inter-
national politics. In other words, the EU will take into account both the need for
cooperation, and the fierce competition it faces on the part of other international
powers, in particular, in its neighbourhood. Sven Biscop rightly points out that this
would represent a turn to “Realpolitik”. Drawing on Ludwig von Rochau, this is understood
not in the traditional sense of the end justifying the means, but as injecting a dose of
realism into the achievement of universal values; in other words, “a rejection of liberal uto-
pianism, but not of liberal ideals themselves” or what Biscop (2016) terms “Realpolitik with
European characteristics” (pp. 1–2).
In a similar vein, Snyder and Vinjamuri (2012, p. 435) refer to principled pragmatism as
“an approach that evaluates the costs and benefits of different strategies on the basis of
their ability to deliver or secure a set of designated principles”. This approach, according to
the authors, focuses on the conditions that allow for those norms or principles to flourish.
In this way, principled pragmatism takes into consideration the “reality” of power and
interests by recognising that norms can only be advanced when they are “anchored in
a supportive configuration of power and interest” (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2012, p. 438).
This also means that we need to consider the consequences of norm-driven actions.
Sometimes pragmatic tactics will need to be employed to avoid undesired social out-
comes, but with the view of promoting moral principles down the line. According to
Snyder and Vinjamuri (2012, p. 442), “[s]ince what we all really care about is improving
people’s lives, we need to assess strategies using act consequentialist criteria, not just
rule consequentialist standards”.
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As argued by Biscop (2016), this turn to pragmatism would explain, for instance, why
the EU has now dropped the emphasis on democratisation of the neighbourhood,
while calling for a policy of building the resilience of states and societies. “Lowering the
level of ambition in terms of democratization is but the acceptance of reality” according
to Biscop (2016, p. 2). At first sight, improving the ability of these countries “to reform”
would suggest that the EU remains agnostic as to what the objective of the reforms
are, leaving those to the recipient states and societies to decide in an effort to apply a
bottom-up approach fully in line with the new discourse of “local ownership”. This
could also be sold as a technocratic, rather than political, intervention, which would
generate less opposition from neighbouring great powers. However, for better or worse,
pragmatism remains tied to principles, which introduces key challenges for those
seeking a more pragmatic policy.
It is important to note that resilience is not a realist or neo-realist strategy as understood
in International Relations theory. There was a conscious effort by the authors of the
EUGS not to use the term “stability”, preferring instead that of resilience. In the minds
of EU policy-makers, stability was associated with a policy of tacit support for authoritarian
powers. Thus, resilience provided “a middle ground between over-ambitious liberal
peace-building and under-ambitious stability” (Wagner and Anholt 2016, p. 4). Resilience
also appears to be different from other cognate terms such as those of “security” or
“defence” (Corry 2014). Resilience does not imply the existence of an “other” we need
to protect ourselves from; it is not state-centric even if some of its instruments still
focus on capacity-building at the state level and it does not seek to address “external
threats”. Its reference point is the building of internal capabilities and capacities in
order to better cope with (mainly) non-military and complex risks (Corry 2014). Hence, resi-
lience appears to be a different strategy from that of “security and defence”, which is
covered in Section 3.1 “The Security of our Union”. Resilience is not proposed as an alterna-
tive to defence, but as a complementary policy. To some extent, we might even argue that
defence comes first. As put by the document itself, “[t]he EU Global Strategy starts at
home” (EUGS 2016, p. 18). As such, the EU has not done away with the language associated
with defence. “External threats” are still mentioned in the text. This is still the preferred
term rather than “risks”, which is only used when talking of broader security threats
(health, technology, etc.). In other words, the EUGS is it still caught between the old
(threats, defence, geopolitics and neo-liberal intervention) and the new logics (risks, resi-
lience, complexity and capacity-building). And this is part of the problem when it comes to
the use of resilience in the EUGS. The EU has adopted the new concept of resilience and a
more pragmatic attitude, but it remains tied to the old scripts. This is particularly the case
when it comes to the “principles” side of the equation.
The EUGS is still very much a liberal rather than a post-liberal strategy. Complexity and
uncertainty are feared rather than embraced as an opportunity. There remains a belief in
universal laws and universal values that the EU should seek to promote through its exter-
nal action. The promotion of values and interests (which go hand in hand in any case,
according to the strategy) constitutes the raison d’être of the EU’s foreign policy. The
EUGS lists these (intertwined) values and interests as follows: peace and security, prosper-
ity, democracy and a rules-based international order, which the EU aims to promote both
within Europe and in its global abroad.
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Resilience is thus wedded to a liberal narrative. Resilience-building – as discussed in
Section 3.2 State and Societal Resilience to our East and South – is intentionally seeking
change, but this change closely follows a liberal strategy. According to the EUGS, building
resilience contributes to sustainable growth and “vibrant societies”. Moreover, it is argued
that a “resilient state is a secure state”. Security and democracy are seen as intertwined and
therefore, a resilient state also requires a democratic state. So, despite attempts to avoid
democratisation, the strategy does link resilience to democracy: “A resilient society featur-
ing democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resi-
lient state” (EUGS 2016, p. 24). Again, in the context of its enlargement policy, resilience
involves “modernisation and democratisation”. Examples of “success” are “prosperous,
peaceful and stable democracies” like Georgia and Tunisia. It is true that in the case of
authoritarian states, the EU does not explicitly refer to democratisation, but it does still
mention the need for “inclusive and accountable governance” and argues that “the EU
will therefore promote human rights through dialogue and support, including in the
most difficult cases. Through long-term engagement, we will persistently seek to
advance human rights protection” (EUGS 2016, pp. 25–26). A liberal approach also
applies to the economic sphere. Prosperity requires free markets and access to reliable
energy-producing and transit countries (EUGS 2016, p. 22).
For those that might see resilience as a move away from the interventionist policies of
the 1990s and the 2000s, there is of course a softening of the discourse, but the liberal
peace discourse is still clearly on the table: “We will act globally to address the root
causes of conflict and poverty, and to champion the indivisibility and universality of
human rights”, with the difference that it now will be done “responsibly”:
In charting the way between the Scylla of isolationism and the Charybdis of rash intervention-
ism, the EU will engage the world manifesting responsibility towards others and sensitivity to
contingency. Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead. (EUGS
2016, p. 16)
By adding “principled” to its pragmatic turn, the EU has sought to square the circle
between the promotion of universal values and doing so on the basis of practical conse-
quences. However, the EU cannot have it both. As argued by Snyder and Vinjamuri (2012,
p. 443), “in a world in which consequences matter, resources are limited, and ethical trade-
offs are unavoidable, actors who strongly emphasize principles and normative consistency
inevitably set themselves up for charges of bad faith”. Unfortunately, principled pragma-
tism will leave the EU open to the same, if not more, criticisms about inconsistencies and
double standards in its external action. Why does the EU privilege stability over democracy
in some cases but not in others? How can one promote freedom and human rights without
democracy? And what happens when security (stability) trumps freedom or economic
equality? For instance, it was clear to many that prior to the Arab Spring, the EU was
privileging stability over democracy promotion in its dealings with authoritarian govern-
ments in the region. Will the fact that now this will be publicly acknowledged mean
that this is then accepted as the right approach? Moreover, the EU also risks undermining
the principles it stands for if it contributes to strengthening authoritarian regimes through
resilience-building policies. This is, for instance, one of the key debates that have sur-
rounded the adoption of the new initiative on CBSD (European Commission and HR/VP
2015a). What happens when the training and equipment of security forces contribute
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to strengthening the hold on power of existing or future authoritarian governments?
Finally, by choosing to act in some cases but not in others, the weaknesses and limitations
of the EU as an international actor will become even more obvious. This is bound to further
undermine its image as a normative/transformative/soft power.
Conclusion: resilience and the EU’s international identity
While the rise of resilience and its associated pragmatist turn could be easily rejected as
more EU jargon and a rhetorical move, this can have important implications on the EU’s
identity as a normative power in the medium and long term. There are both positive
and negative aspects to this. On the one hand, the rise of resilience can work to strengthen
the idea of normative power by underscoring the non-coercive nature of this power. The
EUGS still refers to this ideal of normative or transformative power in several places:
Our enduring power of attraction can spur transformation and is not aimed against any country.
[…] Many people within the scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) both to the
east and to the south wish to build closer relations with the Union. (EUGS 2016, p. 25)
Resilience can contribute to this by working through persuasion, starting from local prac-
tices and local needs, emphasising ownership of the reforms, focusing on partnerships and
capacity-building through a “coaching” approach. Moreover, the inherent ambiguity of
this concept means that it can be “applied in various contexts, adapted to different insti-
tutional visions, and translated into diverse strategies” (Wagner and Anholt 2016, p. 9). This
should facilitate cooperation between different actors involved in the formulation and
implementation of EU policy. However, lack of clarity as to how the EU should build resi-
lience, what kind of resilience and whose resilience might lead to the recurrent problem of
more turf wars in EU foreign policy.
Resilience can also avoid the securitisation of some problems by introducing a long-
term logic and “normalising” risk reduction strategies. In other words, dealing with risk
becomes a “normal” aspect of our daily lives rather than an exceptional circumstance
which requires extraordinary measures, bringing it outside the realm of “normal politics”
(something that has been extensively criticised by securitisation theorists). However,
even if resilience might not lead to securitisation processes, there is always a risk of depo-
liticisation. This is because through its focus on capacity-building and mentoring pro-
grammes, these initiatives are portrayed as mere technocratic exercises, something that
the EU has been long criticised for. Secondly, by putting an emphasis on local actors
and micro-processes, we ignore the bigger picture and the power relations in which exter-
nal actors are implicated (Chandler 2015a). For instance, while the emphasis on capacity-
building through knowledge transfers and financial transfers might suggest a less inter-
ventionist policy, this does not mean a more egalitarian relationship between the EU
and targeted societies. As demonstrated by Merlingen and Ostrauskaite (2005), monitor-
ing, mentoring and advising by EU missions can also be seen as a form of “asymmetric
social control” and domination.
On the other hand, references to resilience and principled pragmatism might also serve
to undermine the EU’s normative power. The EUGS does not problematise the relationship
between interests and values as if the promotion of these would always be in sync and
harmony. However, as the US National Security Strategy acknowledges, sometimes
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“hard choices”will be required (White House 2015, p. ii). Moreover, there remains a tension
between an alleged pragmatic and/or realist approach and the endorsement of liberal
values. Pragmatism challenges the universality of those values, creates double standards
and leaves the EU open to accusations of hypocrisy.
Moreover, the addition of liberal values to the content of resilience-building pro-
grammes means that those that have accused EU policies of being another form of
neo-liberal governmentality or neo-colonialism will see the EUGS as a continuation of
these discourses and practices. While the EU continues to rhetorically support the dis-
course of local ownership, empowerment and partnership, the content of the programmes
will still be expected to conform to “universal” liberal values such as a “rights-based”
approach, good governance, democratisation, modernisation, accountability, free
markets, etc. This is now combined with a declared responsibilisation of the local partners,
but without devolving more power. In sum, while the EUGS tries to square the circle
between the idea of resilience and principled pragmatism, it cannot have it both ways.
Notes
1. See also the Communication on Capacity-Building for Security and Development (European
Commission and HR/VP 2015a).
2. According to Grevi (2016, p. 3),
the word ‘interests’ recurs 36 times in the former (foreword + full text) and only three
times in the [ESS]. It is equally revealing of their different focus, and of the lingering
concern with growing popular dissatisfaction with the EU, that the EUGS refers 30
times to EU ‘citizens’ (their interests, security and needs), whereas they were mentioned
just three times in the ESS.
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